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PATENT REFORM AND BEST MODE: A SIGNAL TO THE
PATENT OFFICE OR A STEP TOWARD ELIMINATION?
Ryan Vacca*
ABSTRACT
On September 16, 2011, President Obama signed the America
Invents Act (―AIA‖) the first major overhaul of the patent system in
nearly sixty years. This article analyzes the recent change to patent
law‘s best mode requirement under the AIA. Before the AIA, patent
applicants were required, at the time of submitting their
application, to disclose the best mode of carrying out the invention
as contemplated by the inventor. A failure to disclose the best mode
was a basis for a finding of invalidity of the relevant claims or could
render the entire patent unenforceable under the doctrine of
inequitable conduct. The AIA still requires patent applicants to
disclose the best mode but has removed the traditional enforcement
mechanisms—declarations of invalidity and unenforceability—as
defenses to patent infringement. In this article, I propose and
explore several innovative techniques that could be used to add
teeth to the seemingly toothless best mode requirement.
Ultimately, I reject these proposals as not being workable solutions
and suggest that Congress‘s resolution of the best mode problem is
nonsensical and that it should completely eliminate the
requirement rather than send mixed signals to the Patent Office
and patent practitioners.

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law. The author gratefully
thanks Sarah Cravens and the participants at Akron‘s Fifth Annual IP Scholars Forum for
their contributions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The best mode requirement of patent law has been the proverbial
redheaded stepchild with respect to disclosures.
Its sibling,
enablement, is seen as the core component of the bargain between
the inventor and the public.1 Without enablement, we would be
thrust back into seventeenth century England, where statesanctioned monopolies were commonly granted at the expense of the
public.2 But best mode has struggled to find its place. Is it central
to the goals of the patent system? Is it uniquely American? Does it
benefit the public? If so, is this benefit worth the costs? These
questions have plagued best mode for years. With passage of the
AIA,3 Congress has partially answered these lingering questions.
But, by definition, when questions are only partially answered
additional unanswered questions remain. This article examines the
AIA‘s changes to the best mode, evaluates what impact those
1 See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA
L. REV. 127, 167 (2008).
2 Michael J. Madison, Beyond Invention: Patent as Knowledge Law, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 71, 79 (2011); see Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Ja1/21/3/contents; see also Mark D. Janis, On Courts
Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly
Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 55, 55 & n.4 (2000) (citation omitted)
(highlighting enablement‘s genesis in the Statute of Monopolies).
3 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
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changes will have and what problems or questions have been raised
as a result, and then sets forth and assesses possible solutions.
Part II reviews the early history of the best mode, its culmination
in the 1952 Patent Act, and the critiques made to the 1952 Act‘s
best mode requirement. Part III discusses the AIA‘s best mode
compromise, including the legislative history leading up to the AIA‘s
enactment, and the potential concern resulting from this
compromise—a lack of means of enforcement. Part IV builds upon
this concern by illustrating how enforcement of the best mode at the
Patent and Trademark Office is nonexistent. Part V describes how
the AIA‘s best mode reform could be seen as a Congressional step
towards complete elimination of best mode or an opportunity for the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (―PTO‖) to use
innovative methods to enforce it. Finally, Part V discusses the
limitations of these innovative methods of enforcement and
concludes that these methods are unlikely to be effective at
encouraging best mode disclosures.
II. BEST MODE BEFORE THE AIA
A. Early History
The origins of best mode stem back to the nation‘s first patent
act—the Patent Act of 1790.4 Section 2 of the 1790 Act required the
patentee to deliver a specification that was sufficiently particular:
[N]ot only to distinguish the invention or discovery from
other things before known and used, but also to enable a
workman or other person skilled in the art or
manufacture . . . to make, construct, or use the same, to the
end that the public may have the full benefit thereof, after
the expiration of the patent term.5
Similarly, section 6 of the 1790 Act contained the ―whole of the
truth‖ defense.6 This defense permitted an alleged infringer to
prevail in the event the patentee‘s specifications either did not
contain all of the information about the invention or contained more
information than ―necessary to produce the effect described.‖7

4 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed); Jerry R. Selinger, In Defense of “Best
Mode”: Preserving the Benefit of the Bargain for the Public, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 1071, 1072
(1994).
5 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (emphasis added).
6 Id. § 6, 1 Stat. at 111–12.
7 Id.
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Furthermore, this defense required either that the concealment or
surplus information actually mislead the public so the described
effect could not be produced by the means specified or that the
patentee intended this to be so.8 Read together, these provisions of
the 1790 Act imposed a requirement that patentees come forward
with all of the relevant detail about their inventions and conceal
nothing from the public, which would lead to full enjoyment of their
inventions after the patents expired.
Three years later, Congress repealed the 1790 Act and replaced it
with the Patent Act of 1793.9 The 1793 Act required patentees to
set forth a written description of their inventions ―in such full, clear
and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things
before known, and to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to
make, compound, and use the same.‖10 This change continued to
increase the chasm between enablement and what would become
best mode. Importantly, the 1793 Act also mandated that ―in the
case of any machine, [the patentee] shall fully explain the principle,
and the several modes in which he has contemplated the application
of that principle or character, by which it may be distinguished from
other inventions . . . .‖11
The 1793 Act also modified the ―whole of the truth‖ defense.12
Section 6 of the 1793 Act permitted an alleged infringer to assert
the ―whole of the truth‖ defense and, if successful, would require the
court to declare the patent void.13 To succeed, the alleged infringer
only needed to prove that the specification did ―not contain the
whole truth relative to [the patentee‘s] discovery, or that it
contain[ed] more than [was] necessary to produce the described
effect, which concealment or addition shall fully appear to have
been made, for the purpose of deceiving the public.‖14 The 1793 Act
removed the burden on the alleged infringer to show that the
described effect could not be achieved through the specified means.15
Thus, the focus on the ―whole of the truth‖ defense was now
squarely focused on the patentee‘s intent to mislead the public.16

See id.
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318.
10 Id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 321.
11 Id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 321–22.
12 Selinger, supra note 4, at 1074.
13 Patent Act of 1793 § 6, 1 Stat at 322.
14 Id.
15 Selinger, supra note 4, at 1074.
16 See id.
8
9

10 VACCA

2011/2012]

2/6/2012 4:12 PM

Patent Reform and Best Mode

283

The Patent Act of 183617 largely left the enablement requirement
unchanged, but it did modify the ―whole of the truth‖ defense to
remove the consequence that the patent be declared void upon a
successful assertion of the defense.18 One of the first cases to
interpret the 1836 Act as calling for a best mode is Page v. Ferry.19
In Page, the alleged infringer asserted that the patentee had
withheld a description of the best mode of effectuating the patented
machine.20 The court stated that ―[t]he patentee is bound to disclose
in his specifications the best method of working his machine known
to him at the time of his application. An infringement will not have
taken place, unless the invention can be practiced completely by
following the specifications.‖21 The court in Page continued on to
explain that ―[t]he specification is intended to teach the public the
improvement patented; it must fully disclose the secret; must give
the best mode known to the inventor, and contain nothing defective,
or that would mislead artists of competent skill in the particular
manufacture.‖22 The court‘s discussion of the best mode was
distinct from its earlier discussion regarding enablement.23 The
best mode requirement had now developed a life of its own,
although not yet codified in the Patent Act.24
Although recognized in Page v. Ferry, the Patent Act of 187025
was the first time the phrase ―best mode‖ was used in patent
legislation.26 In particular, section 26 of the 1870 Act required the
applicant, in the case of a patent for a machine, to ―explain the
principle hereof, and the best mode in which he has contemplated
applying that principle so as to distinguish it from other
inventions.‖27 Of course, the main restriction of this best mode
requirement was that it only applied to patent applications

Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 117–25.
Selinger, supra note 4, at 1075.
19 Page v. Ferry, 18 F. Cas. 979 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1857) (No. 10,662).
20 Id. at 984.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See id. at 983; see also Selinger, supra note 4, at 1079 (explaining that in Page the court
charged the jury separately on best mode and enablement).
24 But see Sewall v. Jones, 91 U.S. 171, 185–86 (1875) (analyzing novelty, but stating ―[t]he
omission to mention in the specification something which contributes only to the degree of
benefit, providing the apparatus would work beneficially and be worth adopting without it, is
not fatal, while the omission of what is known to be necessary to the enjoyment of the
invention is fatal.‖).
25 Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
26 Id. § 26, 16 Stat. at 201; see also 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.05
(Matthew Bender 2010).
27 Patent Act of 1870 § 26, 16 Stat. at 201.
17
18
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regarding machines.28 Interestingly, the 1870 Act preserved the
―whole of the truth‖ defense, which had served as the basis for a
separate best mode requirement until 1870.29
B. The 1952 Patent Act
In 1952, Congress again amended the Patent Act30 and codified
best mode in section 112. The relevant portion of section 112 states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.31
Importantly, best mode was now required for all inventions, not
just machines.32 Also codified was that failure of the inventor to
comply with any of the requirements of section 112, including best
mode, would be a basis for invalidity.33 Missing from the 1952 Act
was the ―whole of the truth‖ defense.34
Initially, courts tended to analyze enablement and best mode
together rather than consider them as distinct requirements.35
However, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (―CCPA‖) soon
clarified that the two requirements were different. In In re Gay,36
the CCPA explained the two requirements as follows:
The essence of [the enablement requirement] is that a
specification shall disclose an invention in such a manner as
will enable one skilled in the art to make and utilize it.
Separate and distinct from [enablement] is [the best mode
requirement], the essence of which requires an inventor to
disclose the best mode contemplated by him, as of the time he
executes the application, of carrying out his invention.
Id.
Id. § 61.
30 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792.
31 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010) (emphasis added).
32 See In re Honn, 364 F.2d 454, 461 n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (―[T]he requirement for disclosing
the best mode of carrying out the invention is stated as generally applicable to all types of
invention.‖); Selinger, supra note 4, at 1080–81.
33 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2010).
34 3 CHISUM, supra note 26, § 7.05.
35 See, e.g., Zoomar, Inc. v. Paillard Prods., Inc., 152 F. Supp. 328, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Lamm v. Watson, 138 F. Supp. 219, 220 (D.D.C. 1955).
36 In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
28
29
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Manifestly, the sole purpose of this latter requirement is to
restrain inventors from applying for patents while at the
same time concealing from the public preferred embodiments
of their inventions which they have in fact conceived.
. . . The question of whether an inventor has or has not
disclosed what he feels is his best mode is, however, a
question separate and distinct from the question of the
sufficiency of his disclosure to satisfy the requirements of
[enablement].37
Later, the Federal Circuit, echoing the CCPA‘s explanation in In
re Gay, explained:
Enablement looks to placing the subject matter of the claims
generally in the possession of the public. If, however, the
applicant develops specific instrumentalities or techniques
which are recognized at the time of filing as the best way of
carrying out the invention, then the best mode requirement
imposes an obligation to disclose that information to the
public as well.38
The policy rationale underlying best mode is based on the quid
pro quo basis of patent law.39 The Federal Circuit has described the
purpose of best mode as requiring ―that [the] patent applicant play[
] ‗fair and square‘ with the patent system,‖40 meaning that the
patentee should not receive from the public the right to exclude
―while at the same time concealing from [it the] preferred
embodiments of the[] invention.‖41 In other words, the patentee
should not be able to obtain the benefits of a patent while
maintaining part of the invention as a trade secret—the antithesis
of a patent. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
articulated a variation of this policy rationale—to create a level
playing field so the public (via competitors) can compete fairly after
the patent expires.42
As noted, under earlier patent acts, failure to satisfy the best
mode was a basis for refusing to grant a patent and could also be
asserted as a defense to infringement and as a basis for a finding of
invalidity.43 The 1952 Patent Act carried this forward; section 282

37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Id. at 772.
Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
3 CHISUM, supra note 26, § 7.05[1][a].
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1209–10 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Wahl Instruments, Inc. v. Acvious, Inc., 950 F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 870 F.2d 1292, 1302 n.8 (7th Cir. 1989).
See supra Part II.A.
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provided for invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure
to comply with any requirement of section 112.44 Although distinct
from invalidity, failure to satisfy the best mode also served as a
basis for inequitable conduct, which would render the patent
unenforceable.45
To determine whether best mode has been complied with, the
Federal Circuit established a two-prong inquiry.46 The first part is
a subjective inquiry.47 It must be determined whether the inventor,
at the time the patent application was filed, ―knew of a mode of
practicing [the] claimed invention that [the inventor] considered to
be better than any other.‖48 If the first prong is satisfied, then the
second prong is considered.49 The second prong is objective.50 This
prong asks whether what the inventor knew under the first prong
was adequately disclosed so as ―to enable one skilled in the art to
practice the [best] mode.‖51
Over the last couple of decades, issues regarding interpretation of
the best mode have arisen and the courts (primarily the Federal
Circuit) have been called upon to clarify (sometimes unsuccessfully)
these issues.52 One early question that arose was whether an
employer, who was the assignee of the patent, would have its
knowledge of a preferred embodiment imputed to the
employee/inventor and therefore violate the best mode if this
preferred embodiment was not adequately disclosed.53 The Federal
Circuit rejected the imputation theory, holding that ―[t]he statutory
language [of section 112] could not be clearer‖ and that what must
be disclosed is the best mode contemplated by the inventor.54
A second issue involving best mode concerned whether the

35 U.S.C. § 282 (2010).
See Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 1321–22 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (holding that intentionally concealing the mode used to make the invention may
provide a basis for finding inequitable conduct).
46 3 CHISUM, supra note 26, at § 7.05[1]; Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d
923, 927–28 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
47 Chemcast, 913 F.2d at 928.
48 Id. at 928.
49 See id.
50 Id. (―Assessing the adequacy of the disclosure, as opposed to its necessity, is largely an
objective inquiry that depends upon the scope of the claimed invention and the level of skill in
the art.‖).
51 Id.
52 See Matthew H. Solomson, Patently Confusing: The Federal Circuit’s Inconsistent
Treatment of Claim Scope as a Limit on the Best Mode Disclosure Requirement, 45 IDEA 383,
387 (2005).
53 Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
54 Id.
44
45
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applicant was required to specifically signify which mode of the
several listed is the best.55 In Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., the
Federal Circuit held that the indiscriminate disclosure of the best
mode along with other possible modes satisfied the best mode
requirement.56
A third issue that arose concerned the scope of the best mode.57
In other words, is best mode limited to the elements listed in the
claims or does it require the inventor to disclose the best mode
relating to unclaimed elements of the invention?58 Although
addressing it frequently, the Federal Circuit has failed to answer
this question with any certainty and the question still lingers
today.59
In sum, based on the statutory language of section 112 and courts‘
interpretations of it, it is clear that best mode comprises a
subjective and objective inquiry, must be examined at the time the
patent application is filed rather than when the patent is issued, is
solely examined from the perspective of the inventor, and does not
have to be specifically labeled in the patent application.60 However,
much confusion still exists regarding the scope of the best mode.
C. Critiques of Best Mode
In addition to some of the confusion surrounding its
requirements, best mode has come under attack as a matter of
policy on multiple fronts. These critiques of best mode can be
broken down into three categories: (1) failure to achieve its purpose,
(2) litigation costs, and (3) international harmonization. Each will
be discussed in turn.
The first critique of best mode is that the way the rule is written
and has been interpreted does not necessarily achieve the ends it
seeks to accomplish. As described earlier, one purpose of best mode
is to ensure that the public is put on a level playing field with the

See Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 589 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Id.
57 See Solomson, supra note 52, at 387.
58 Melissa N. McDonough, Note, To Agree, or Not to Agree: That is the Question When
Evaluating the Best Mode Preferences of Joint Inventors After Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 80 S. CAL.
L. REV. 151, 158 (2006).
59 McDonough, supra note 58, at 158; see Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306,
1316–20 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (describing instances when the best mode has been lacking despite a
claim not existing to that element); see generally Solomson, supra note 52, at 387–420
(explaining the different approaches used by the Federal Circuit and CCPA and how they do
not set forth a consistent standard for analyzing the scope of best mode).
60 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010).
55
56
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patentee upon expiration of the patent.61 Yet the best mode does
not necessarily reach that goal for a variety of reasons. As
discussed, best mode is subjective—only the best mode
contemplated by the inventor needs to be divulged.62 Therefore,
even if the inventor complies and discloses the best mode known to
the inventor, this does not necessarily mean that the best mode, in
an objective sense, will be revealed to the public.63 Similarly,
because knowledge cannot be imputed from the inventor‘s
employer,64 this limits the assurance that the best mode will in fact
be disclosed.65 Likewise, because best mode only requires the best
mode to be disclosed if the inventor has a best mode in mind, if an
inventor is ambivalent towards multiple modes, then no best mode
needs to be disclosed.66
Another reason best mode does not necessarily achieve its goal of
putting the public on a level playing field is that changes in
technology may result in an outdated best mode before the end of
the patent term.67 This is especially true in industries such as
computer software and hardware where technology advances so
quickly that even if the inventor disclosed the best mode at the time
the application was filed it is quite likely, if not inevitable, that by
the time the patent expires the technology will have changed
dramatically and rendered the disclosed best mode a relic.68
The second critique of best mode is that it drives up the costs of
litigation while failing to provide a commensurate benefit. In 1992,
the Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform published a report
to the Secretary of Commerce, which proposed eliminating best
mode.69 The committee laudably noted the goals of best mode, but
expressed doubt as to whether best mode achieves these goals and
whether the costs of best mode outweigh the benefit it actually

See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010).
63 THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE 102 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 REPORT]; see also McDonough, supra note 58, at 177
(arguing that the best mode requirement is subjectively based on the inventor‘s opinion on
what is the best mode).
64 Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
65 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 121 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter NRC REPORT].
66 McDonough, supra note 58, at 177; see also 3 CHISUM, supra note 26, § 7.05[1][c][i][B]
(―[Courts] find no violation if there is no evidence that the inventor subjectively preferred any
one of several possible implementations of the invention.‖).
67 See 1992 REPORT, supra note 63, at 102; McDonough, supra note 58, at 179.
68 1992 REPORT, supra note 63, at 102.
69 Id. at 102.
61
62
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provides.70 One such cost of best mode the committee noted was the
cost of discovery in trying to uncover the subjective beliefs of the
inventor.71 In 2004, the National Research Council (―NRC‖), as part
of the National Academies, published a report recommending
changes to the patent system.72 Echoing the recommendation of the
1992 Advisory Commission report, one recommendation made by
the NRC was the elimination of best mode.73 The report noted that
one factor which increased the costs of patent litigation (via
expensive pretrial discovery) was the existence of legal issues which
depend on a party‘s state of mind.74 These additional costs, the
NRC opined, were not outweighed by the benefits provided by
applicants complying with the best mode, especially in light of the
enablement requirement which already obligated the inventor to
disclose how to make and use the invention (albeit not necessarily
the best mode of making and using the invention).75
The final critique of best mode deals with international
harmonization. The NRC report notes that best mode is unique to
the United States.76 Because of this, it is thought to be unfair to
foreign applicants who file for a patent in their home countries
where best mode is not required and who then must amend their
U.S. patent application to comply with an additional requirement.77
Moreover, foreign inventors may be prejudiced by best mode in that
it may restrict their ability to claim priority using their previously
filed foreign application.78 To establish priority rights under a
previously filed foreign application the applicant must have fully
complied with the U.S. disclosure provisions, including best mode. 79
A failure to do so results in a later effective filing date, which could
result in the loss of U.S. patent rights that, but for the failure to

See id. at 101.
Id.
72 NRC REPORT, supra note 65.
73 Id. at 121.
74 Id. at 117.
75 Id. at 120–21.
Later, the NRC noted that between willful infringement, inequitable
conduct, and best mode as the upward drivers of litigation costs, ―[b]est mode ranked a
distant third.‖ Id. at 123.
76 Id. at 121; but see Dale L. Carlson et al., Patent Linchpin for the 21st Century?—Best
Mode Revisited, 45 IDEA 267, 283–84 (2005) (listing countries beyond the United States that
require a best mode disclosure).
77 NRC REPORT, supra note 65, at 121.
78 See Donald S. Chisum, Best Mode Concealment and Inequitable Conduct in Patent
Procurement: A Nutshell, a Review of Recent Federal Circuit Cases and a Plea for Modest
Reform, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 277, 282 (1997).
79 Id.
70
71
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disclose the best mode, would have been granted.80
To be sure, best mode supporters have challenged each of these
critiques.81 Nonetheless, the critics prevailed (at least partially)
and persuaded Congress to change best mode as a result of patent
reform.
III. THE AIA‘S CHANGES TO BEST MODE
Underlying the AIA is six years of patent reform history, which
played a fundamental role in shaping the AIA‘s best mode
amendments. In 2005, the House of Representatives proposed a bill
that would have eliminated best mode.82 This bill was referred to
the Judiciary Committee, but never made it out of committee.83 The
next year the Senate proposed its own reforms, which made no
modifications to best mode.84 As with the House bill from the
previous year, the Senate bill was referred to the Judiciary
Committee, but never made it out.85
In 2007, the House proposed another patent reform bill, but this
time the bill kept best mode a requirement for patentability while
removing it as a defense in litigation and cancellation of claims.86
The House Judiciary Committee Report reflected concerns that best
mode was unique to the United States, inherently subjective, and
often technologically irrelevant.87 This bill was passed by the
House, but was never voted on by the Senate.88 The Senate also

See McDonough, supra note 58, at 176.
See generally Carlson, supra note 76, at 273–283 (identifying several criticisms of best
mode and addressing each in turn); Selinger, supra note 4 (defending best mode against
critiques specifically made within the 1990 Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform); see
generally Wesley D. Markham, Is Best Mode the Worst? Dueling Arguments, Empirical
Analysis, and Recommendations for Reform, 51 IDEA 129 (2011) (evaluating the arguments
for and against best mode).
82 Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 4(d) (2005); Markham, supra note
81, at 157.
83 See H.R. 2795: Patent Act of 2005, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bill.xpd?bill=h109-2795 (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
84 See Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); Markham, supra note 81, at
157.
85 See S. 3818: Patent Reform Act of 2006, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-3818 (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
86 Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. §§ 6(f)(1), 13 (2007); Markham,
supra note 81, at 157.
87 See H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 43–44 (2007); Markham, supra note 81, at 157–58. A best
mode could be technologically irrelevant because ―best mode applies only to what the inventor
knew at the time of filing, not modes of practice that may be created or refined thereafter.
Accordingly, by the time of patent litigation, the best mode may already be obsolete.‖ H.R.
REP. NO. 110-314, at 44 (2007).
88 See H.R. 1908: Patent Reform Act of 2007, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/
80
81
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introduced a patent reform bill in 2007, which again was silent on
best mode.89 Yet as discussion and debate on the Senate bill moved
forward, members of the Judiciary Committee noted in a press
release that they were working with interested parties to develop a
workable solution to best mode.90 Pressures by competing interests
groups had caused Congress to give serious considerations to best
mode.91 Nonetheless, this Senate bill was never voted on by the
Senate.92
In 2009, the Senate introduced patent reform legislation with a
compromised best mode requirement—required for obtaining a
patent, but not a defense in litigation or a basis for cancellation.93
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report was nearly identical to the
report accompanying the AIA in that it cited the same critiques of
best mode while recognizing the importance of disclosure to the
patent system.94 Despite the Senate coming around to the proposal
originally made by the House in 2007, the House‘s 2009 patent
reform bill did not eliminate best mode as a defense in litigation.95
The Senate bill was never voted on by the Senate96 and the House
bill was referred to committee but never made it out.97
Finally, after several years of attempted compromise, patent
reform measures were agreed to and the AIA was passed. The
change to best mode is found in section 15 of the AIA. This section
provides:
(a) In General.—Section 282 of title 35, United States
Code, is amended in the second undesignated paragraph by
striking paragraph (3) and inserting the following:
―(3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for
failure to comply with—

congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1908 (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
89 See Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007); Markham, supra note 81, at
158.
90 Markham, supra note 81, at 158–59.
91 See generally id. at 133–35 (noting the split of opinion on best mode between brand
name and generic pharmaceutical companies).
92 See S. 1145: Patent Reform Act of 2007, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-1145 (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
93 Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. §§ 5(f), 14 (2009); Markham, supra note
81, at 159.
94 S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 24–25 (2009); Markham, supra note 81, at 159.
95 Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 6(h) (2009); Markham, supra note
81, at 160.
96 See S. 515: Patent Reform Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bill.xpd?bill=s111-515 (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
97 See H.R. 1260: Patent Reform Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-1260 (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).

10 VACCA

292

2/6/2012 4:12 PM

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 75.1

―(A) any requirement of section 112, except that the
failure to disclose the best mode shall not be a basis
on which any claim of a patent may be canceled or
held invalid or otherwise unenforceable; or
―(B) any requirement of section 251.‖.
(b) Conforming Amendment.—Sections 119(e)(1) and 120
of title 35, United States Code, are each amended by striking
―the first paragraph of section 112 of this title‖ and inserting
―section 112(a) (other than the requirement to disclose the
best mode)‖.
(c) Effective Date.—The amendments made by this section
shall take effect upon the date of the enactment of this Act
and shall apply to proceedings commenced on or after that
date.98
In short, as of September 16, 2011, section 15 eliminated best
mode as a basis for asserting invalidity, inequitable conduct, or
cancellation of any or all claims in a patent while at the same time
leaving best mode in section 112 untouched.99 As a result, patent
applicants must disclose the best mode to receive a patent, but in
the event a patent is obtained despite a failure to comply with
section 112‘s best mode requirement no challenge to the patent
rights can be made based on this failure.100
The legislative history of the AIA‘s best mode amendment is
relatively sparse, but builds upon the years of unsuccessful
attempts at patent reform discussed earlier.101 The House Judiciary
Committee Report indicates that the elimination of best mode as a
defense to patent infringement was decided based on best mode
being unique to the United States, inherently subjective, and often
technologically irrelevant.102
Thus, Congress bought into the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 15, 125 Stat. 284, 328 (2011).
Compare Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 15, 125 Stat. 284, 328
(2011) (eliminating best mode as a basis for asserting invalidity), with 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010)
(―The specification . . . shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor . . . .‖).
100 Paragraph (b) of section 15 makes two conforming amendments to sections 119 and 120
of the Patent Act. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 15, 125 Stat. 284,
328 (2011). The change to section 119 eliminates compliance with the best mode for purposes
of priority with a provisional application. Id. The change to section 120 eliminates best mode
as a requirement for priority in continuing applications. Id.
101 See supra notes 82–97 and accompanying text.
102 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 112TH CONG., REP. ON THE AMERICA INVENTS
ACT 52 (Comm. Print 2011). For support, the committee report cites to arguments made by
the National Academy of Sciences, the Biotechnology Industry Organization, the American
Intellectual Property Law Association, the Intellectual Property Owners Association, and
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. Id. at 53 n.54. With respect to
technological irrelevance, the report states that ―the best mode contemplated at the time of
98
99
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arguments made by best mode critics, but compromised and refused
to go as far as many requested103 because Congress also recognized
that the required disclosures, including best mode, are an
―important tradeoff that underlies the patent laws: the grant of a
limited-term monopoly in exchange for disclosure of the
invention.‖104
Before passage of the AIA, a patent applicant could file a patent
application, conceal the best mode, and if the PTO caught the error,
then the application could be rejected.105 If the PTO failed to catch
the concealment, then the risk of having the claims declared invalid
or unenforceable during litigation remained.106
With the AIA‘s amendment to best mode, a patent applicant who
conceals the best mode runs the same risk of the PTO catching the
error and rejecting the application.107
But if the applicant
successfully avoids having this error caught by the PTO, the
applicant no longer faces the looming risks of invalidity or
unenforceability.108 As a result, there may now be an incentive to
actively conceal the best mode as long as the risks of PTO detection
are sufficiently low.
IV. BEST MODE AT THE PTO
The risk of detection by the PTO of a best mode omission is a key
component in determining whether applicants will voluntarily

invention may not be the best mode for practicing or using the invention years later.‖ Id. at
52. Of course, as is clear from section 112‘s language, the relevant time period for best mode
is not the time of invention, but rather the time the patent application is filed. Id.; 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (2010).
103 See 1992 REPORT, supra note 63, at 100–01 (urging elimination of best mode); NRC
REPORT, supra note 65, at 121 (urging same).
104 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 112TH CONG., REP. ON THE AMERICA INVESTS
ACT 52 (Comm. Print 2011).
105 See id.
106 See id.
107 See id. (explaining that the best mode requirement is retained for patent prosecution
and eliminated only as a defense to invalidity).
108 One could argue that inequitable conduct based on a failure to disclose the best mode to
the PTO is still a viable defense in litigation. The argument is that section 15 of the AIA only
prohibits failure to disclose the best mode to be a basis for invalidity or unenforceability and
that a defendant is not asserting failure to disclose the best mode as the direct basis; instead,
the defendant is asserting inequitable conduct before the PTO as the direct basis. LeahySmith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 15, 125 Stat. 284, 328 (2011). This
argument is unlikely to prevail. First, section 15 does not draw a distinction between failure
to disclose the best mode as a direct basis and as an indirect basis. See id. Second, Congress
was aware that best mode violations were frequently styled as inequitable conduct claims and
this likely serves as the reason why section 15 prohibits not just invalidity based on best
mode violations, but also unenforceability—the result of a finding of inequitable conduct.
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comply with section 112‘s best mode requirement. But the risk of
rejection at the PTO for failure to disclose the best mode is almost
nonexistent.109
The difficulty of detection at the PTO is the subjective prong of
the two-part best mode test.110 Rarely is there evidence before the
patent examiner that would permit the examiner to conclude that
the inventor, at the time of filing the application, actually knew of a
better mode of practicing the claimed invention.111 In fact, the
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (―MPEP‖) tells examiners
that they ―should assume that the best mode is disclosed in the
application, unless evidence is presented that is inconsistent with
that assumption‖112 and notes that ―[i]t is extremely rare that a best
mode rejection properly would be made in ex parte prosecution.‖113
This presumption of compliance with the best mode is not to say
that a rejection for failure to disclose the best mode is impossible. 114
In theory, this type of evidence could be discovered during
prosecution while making an argument to the examiner about the
underlying technology or in reference to an office action concerning
another requirement of patentability.115
However, a recent study reviewed published decisions of the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (―BPAI‖) from 1981
through 2009.116
The author found only six BPAI decisions
involving an examiner rejecting claims because of a failure to satisfy
the best mode.117 Of those six cases, the BPAI reversed the
examiner‘s best mode rejection in five cases and did not reach the
issue in the sixth case.118 Of course, the limitation of this study is
109 Matthew J. Dowd et al., Nanotechnology and the Best Mode, 2 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. &
BUS. 238, 249 (2005) (―The PTO rarely issues a rejection for failure to comply with the best
mode.‖).
110 Id. at 244–45 (―[A]scertaining the best mode or even the existence of a best mode, poses
difficulties—especially years later.‖).
111 U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2165.03 (8th ed., 8th rev. 2010) (―The information that is necessary
to form the basis for a rejection based on the failure to set forth the best mode is rarely
accessible . . . .‖).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. (―The information that is necessary to form the basis for a rejection . . . is generally
uncovered during discovery procedures in . . . inter partes proceedings.‖).
115 Steven B. Walmsley, Best Mode: A Plea to Repair or Sacrifice This Broken Requirement
of United States Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 125, 158 (2002) (―Such
evidence . . . might emerge during prosecution of the application, perhaps in a technical
argument to the examiner . . . .‖).
116 Markham, supra note 81, at 152.
117 Id.
118 Id.
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that not every rejection by an examiner is appealed to the BPAI. 119
Nonetheless, given the presumption of compliance with the best
mode in the MPEP120 and the infrequent number of appeals relating
to best mode it is not a large leap of faith to presume that the risk of
detection at the PTO for failure to disclose the best mode is, for all
intents and purposes, nonexistent.
V. EXTINCTION OR INNOVATIVE ENFORCEMENT?
Given that enforcement of best mode is now off the table for
purposes of invalidity, unenforceability, and cancellation and there
is essentially no risk of detection at the PTO for failure to disclose
the best mode, the obvious question is: What is best mode‘s fate?
We are at a fork in the road of best mode‘s journey. One path leads
to the complete elimination of best mode; the other leads to
innovative means of enforcement.
A. Complete Elimination of the Best Mode
Presumably Congress realized that the PTO had effectively
abandoned best mode during examination and that the AIA‘s best
mode amendments would leave this requirement without any
teeth.121 Given the several years of back and forth proposals
between the House and Senate about whether to completely
eliminate best mode or remove the commonly used enforcement
mechanisms, it could be that the AIA was simply the first step in a
two-step reform.
The second step in this process is to completely eliminate best
mode as a requirement for patentability. Giving the stakeholders
an opportunity to digest the changes made by the AIA may make
eventual elimination easier to accept down the road.
Of course—knowing that the PTO does not actually enforce best
mode—it seems odd that best mode proponents would have been
satisfied with the AIA‘s compromise. There are other points along
the spectrum of best mode reform that would perhaps have been

119 Id. (acknowledging the study‘s limitation to appellate data because the PTO does not
specifically track best mode rejections by examiners).
120 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 111, § 2165.03.
121 See A. Christal Sheppard, Because Inquiring Minds Want to Know—Best Mode—Why is
it One-Sided?, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/
2011/09/guest-post-because-inquiring-minds-want-to-know-best-mode-why-is-it-one-sided.html (―This result was absolutely contemplated by the decision makers.‖).
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more palatable to best mode supporters.122
Under this
interpretation, advocates of eliminating best mode have achieved—
as a practical matter—what they set out to accomplish, while letting
best mode supporters preserve best mode as a mere keepsake.
B. Innovative Enforcement
Congress‘s piecemeal elimination of best mode is an unsatisfying
explanation. If Congress really intended to abolish best mode, then
it easily could have done so, especially given how close the AIA
comes to this. Another possible interpretation of what Congress
was doing in the AIA is that it was sending a signal to the PTO to
be more diligent about examining the best mode in patent
applications. To do so, the PTO will need to create new methods of
enforcement or use existing tools that have been underutilized.
1. The Basis—Rule 1.105
One tool the PTO could employ to enforce best mode is to use
Requirements for Information (―RFIs‖) under Rule 1.105.123 Rule
1.105 provides, in relevant part, that in the course of examining an
application, the examiner may require the applicant, patent
attorney or agent, and associates to submit ―such information as
may be reasonably necessary to properly examine or treat the
matter.‖124
The bounds of the RFIs have been liberally construed by the
Federal Circuit.125 In Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., the Federal Circuit
held an RFI sent to an applicant seeking ―any information available
regarding the sale or other public distribution of the claimed plant
variety anywhere in the world‖ was proper.126 The applicant
refused to provide the information because it believed the
information requested ―was ‗not material to the patentability of the
[plant] variety.‘‖127 As a result, the application was deemed
abandoned and the applicant brought suit alleging that the director
of the PTO abused his discretion in denying the applicant‘s
122 For example, best mode reform could have: (1) eliminated it for invalidity, but not
inequitable conduct; (2) allowed best mode to be used in cancellations; (3) required applicants
to update the best mode before the patent issued; or (4) required patentees to update the best
mode upon renewal.
123 37 C.F.R. § 1.105 (2011).
124 Id. § 1.105(a)(1).
125 See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281–83 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
126 Id. at 1280.
127 Id.
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challenge to the RFI.128 The Federal Circuit rejected the applicant‘s
argument and held that the PTO can request information under
Rule 1.105 ―that does not directly support a rejection.‖129 In fact,
the court continued in its explanation of the scope of RFIs and
stated ―that ‗such information as may be reasonably necessary to
properly examine or treat the matter,‘‖ as specified in Rule 1.105
―contemplates information relevant to examination either
procedurally or substantively. It includes a zone of information
beyond that defined by section 1.56 as material to patentability, and
beyond that which is directly useful to support a rejection or
conclusively decide the issue of patentability.‖130 Thus, Star Fruits
gives the PTO wide authority to inquire into areas that otherwise
might appear to be tangential to patentability.
Armed with this broad authority, the PTO could, as a standard
practice, request an applicant or patent attorney (or agent) to
indicate whether the inventor had a best mode, and if so, to point
out what particular language in the specification discloses it.
Although this runs counter to the decisions in cases holding that the
applicant need not specifically identify the best mode,131 this type of
RFI would not necessarily run afoul of the PTO‘s power under 1.105
because this information could be useful in concluding that the
objective prong of the best mode test was satisfied.
Perhaps knowing that the PTO will specifically inquire into best
mode via an RFI will alleviate the problem of applicants failing to
disclose the best mode. If applicants, their patent attorneys, or
agents know that they will be asked about whether best mode has
been complied with, then they may be more willing to initially
disclose because of the possible sanctions for failing to disclose,
which are discussed in the following sections.132
Also, in theory, with this additional information provided to the
PTO, the examiner could engage in a more thorough best mode
analysis (i.e. determining whether the disclosed best mode satisfies
the objective prong of the test). Of course, for the dishonest
applicant, patent attorney, or agent, this latter result is most
certainly unlikely to occur. For them, the means of enforcement
described below could apply.

128
129
130
131
132

Id.
Id. at 1281–82.
Id. at 1282.
See, e.g., Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 589 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
See infra Parts V.B.2 and V.B.3.
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2. Criminal Means
One method of enforcing best mode could be through the federal
False Statements Statute (―FSS‖). The FSS provides, in relevant
part:
[W]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government
of the United States, knowingly and willfully . . . makes any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned
not more than 5 years . . . or both.133
If the patent examiner submits an RFI to the patent applicant
requesting that the applicant indicate whether he or she has a best
mode, and if so, to particularly point out where in the specification
it is, then falsely stating that no best mode exists or that the
referenced language in the specification is the best mode would
constitute a violation of the FSS. The response to the RFI would
constitute a false statement.
Materiality is determined by whether the statement is capable of
influencing or affecting a federal agency.134 The false statement
about the best mode or lack thereof would be material in that
disclosure of the best mode is still a requirement for patentability
under section 112 and a false statement to avoid making a required
disclosure would certainly be capable of influencing or affecting the
PTO‘s decision to grant or reject a patent application.
The knowledge requirement for a violation of the FSS ―relates
only to the defendant‘s knowledge and intent that the statements
[the defendant] made to a government entity were false or were
made with the conscious purpose of evading the truth.‖135
With respect to best mode disclosures, an applicant who falsely
responded to an RFI, indicating that the applicant did not know of a
best mode while in fact having one or by pointing out inferior modes
in the specification would, by definition, demonstrate knowledge
that the statement was false. This is in contrast to the scenario in
which the applicant files the patent application and simply fails to
disclose the best mode or to specifically point out where in the
specification it lies. In that case, the applicant would be in a better
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2010).
See, e.g., United States v. Serv. Deli Inc., 151 F.3d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing
what constitutes materiality); United States v. Puente, 982 F.2d 156, 159 (5th Cir. 1993)
(discussing same); U.S. v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1415 (10th Cir. 1991) (discussing same).
135 U.S. v. Lupton, 620 F.3d 790, 806 (7th Cir. 2010).
133
134
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position to assert that the applicant did not make a false statement
at all or that the application itself, even if a statement, was not
made with a conscious purpose of evading the truth because the
applicant was simply complying with existing patent law.136
The final requirement for a violation of the FSS requires that the
statement be made in any matter within the jurisdiction of the
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the U.S. government.137
This jurisdictional requirement is satisfied when the federal agency
―has the power to exercise authority in a particular situation,‖ as
opposed to ―‗matters peripheral to the business of that body.‘‖138
The PTO is certainly an executive branch agency139 and
undoubtedly the PTO has the power to exercise authority to grant
patents.140
In sum, if the PTO were to use RFIs to inquire into the best mode,
then this would provide a foundation for referring criminal
prosecutions to the Department of Justice. There are, of course,
limitations to this method of enforcement,141 but even the threat of
criminal prosecution may help chill failures to disclose the best
mode.
3. Ethical Means
In addition to criminal prosecutions under the FSS, enforcement
of best mode concealments might be done via disciplinary action
against the applicant‘s patent attorney or agent. In short, this
technique would shift the risk from the applicant to the patent
attorney or agent and force that individual to risk his or her license
to practice before the PTO or, in the case of patent attorneys, to
practice law generally. Presumably, most patent attorneys or
agents would be unwilling to take this risk on behalf of their clients‘
abilities to keep the best mode a secret.
Patent Office Rule 1.56 states that ―[e]ach individual associated
with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of
candor and good faith.‖142 This duty requires the individual to
136 See Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 589 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (failing to
specifically point out which mode is the best is not a violation of section 112).
137 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2010).
138 U.S. v. Davis, 8 F.3d 923, 929 (2nd Cir. 1993) (quoting U.S. v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475,
479 (1984)).
139 Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1965, 1973-74 (2009).
140 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2010).
141 See infra Part V.B.4.
142 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2011).
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disclose to the PTO all information known to that individual to be
material to patentability.143 Failure to do so constitutes a violation
of the patent attorney‘s or patent agent‘s ethical duty not to ―engage
in disreputable or gross misconduct,‖ ―conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,‖ or ―conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice.‖144
A violation of the duty of candor under Rule 1.56, like with a
violation of the FSS, may result if a patent attorney or patent agent
knows the applicant has a best mode, but fails to disclose it or fails
to specifically designate it in response to an RFI.145 This violation
may subject the patent attorney or patent agent to discipline before
the Office of Enrollment and Discipline.146
Beyond the duty of candor in Rule 1.56, other PTO rules could be
used by the PTO in an attempt to enforce best mode disclosures.
For example, Rule 10.85 prohibits patent attorneys and agents from
―[k]nowingly making a false statement of law or fact‖147 or
counseling or assisting a client in conduct known to be
fraudulent.148 Moreover, patent attorneys and agents have a duty
to promptly call upon the client to rectify a fraud perpetrated upon
the PTO and if the client fails to do so, then to reveal the fraud to
the PTO, in the event the attorney or agent receives information
clearly establishing such fraudulent conduct.149
These PTO
disciplinary rules also have similar counterparts under the state
disciplinary rules, which would be relevant if the PTO were to refer
a matter to the relevant jurisdiction.150
If the PTO were to use RFIs as described above,151 this would
force patent attorneys and agents to consult with their clients and

Id.
Id. §§ 10.23(a), (b)(4)–(5).
145 See Tamsen Valoir & David Hricik, Patents and Trademarks: The Duty of Good Faith,
89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 287, 292 (2007).
146 See id. at 293; 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.20(b), 10.23(a), (c)(10) (2011).
147 37 C.F.R. § 10.85(a)(5) (2011).
148 Id. § 10.85(a)(7).
149 Id. § 10.85(b)(1).
150 See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2011) (prohibiting false statements
of material fact); id. R. 3.3(a)(3) (prohibiting an attorney from offering evidence known to be
false); id. R. 3.3(b) (requiring an attorney who knows the client is engaging or has engaged in
fraudulent conduct in an adjudicative proceeding to take reasonable remedies, including
disclosure if necessary); id. R. 3.3(d) (―[A] lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts
known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or
not the facts are adverse.‖); see also id. R. 1.13(a)–(b) (requiring attorneys representing
organizations to report to a higher authority any conduct that could result in a violation of a
legal obligation or that could result in substantial injury to the organization).
151 See supra Part V.B.1.
143
144
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attempt to force them to confront the best mode issue specifically or
at least make it more difficult to bury their heads in the sand. And
similar to enforcement in the criminal context, if the PTO were to
use RFIs to inquire into best mode, then this would provide a
foundation for disciplining patent attorneys and agents who knew
about the applicant‘s attempts to conceal the best mode and
conspired with them or failed to take corrective action. As with the
criminal prosecution method of enforcement, there are, of course,
limitations to this method,152 but the threat of disciplinary action
against patent attorneys or agents may help reduce concealment of
the best mode.
4. Limitations
Despite the potential for the PTO to use RFIs in conjunction with
criminal and ethical techniques to enforce best mode, there are
several limitations to these techniques, which render them
ineffective or otherwise unwise options for enforcement.
The first limitation on both the criminal and ethical methods of
enforcement is the difficulty of discovering evidence of a violation.
Under the FSS, knowledge of the false statement is a necessary
element.153 Under the disciplinary rules, the attorney‘s or agent‘s
knowledge about the applicant‘s knowledge is required.154 Before
the AIA, discovery of best mode violations were uncovered in the
pretrial discovery process during litigation, as defendants would
seek to invalidate claims for failure to disclose the best mode.155
Upon passage of the AIA, failure to disclose the best mode is no
longer a basis to assert invalidity or unenforceability.156 As a result,
a defendant‘s ability to seek information related to the best mode is
severely hampered. Given that one of the purposes of the AIA was
to reduce the costs of litigation, it seems entirely possible that a
patentee could successfully object to discovery requests relating to
best mode and obtain a protective order limiting discovery.157
Therefore, the likelihood of the PTO, its Office of Enrollment and
Discipline, the DOJ, or a state disciplinary board being made aware
of the violation is quite low.158
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

See infra Part V.B.4.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 143–49 and accompanying text.
See NRC REPORT, supra note 65, at 121.
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 15, 125 Stat. 284, 328 (2011).
See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 40 (2011).
It would not be impossible to discover this information. Discovery of best mode
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The second limitation to the criminal and ethical methods of
enforcement is the statutes of limitation. Prosecution for a violation
of the FSS must commence within five years after the offense has
been committed.159 Therefore, even if evidence were uncovered to
show that the applicant, patent attorney, or agent had knowingly
made a materially false statement regarding best mode, it very well
might be too late to be useful. Moreover, an argument to toll the
statute of limitations until discovery of the false statement will not
succeed. In U.S. v. Dunne, the Tenth Circuit rejected such an
argument by the government and held that ―[t]he ability of the
government . . . to learn of a particular offense is not a relevant
factor.‖160
The statute of limitations for the ethical method of enforcement is
less problematic, but still poses a problem. The AIA amends the
limitations period so that any disciplinary actions must be brought
before the earlier of ten years from the date of the misconduct or
one year after the date the misconduct is made known to the
PTO.161 Although the limitations period is longer for disciplinary
actions and contains a discovery rule provision, the discovery rule
provision is capped at ten years after the misconduct.162 As a result,
unless discovery of evidence of a best mode concealment takes place
relatively quickly, the applicable statutes of limitation will severely
limit the criminal and ethical methods of enforcement.
The third limitation relates to ethical enforcement. The threat of
disciplinary sanctions from the PTO‘s Office of Enrollment and
Discipline or state disciplinary commission is limited to lawyers
(and patent agents in the case of the PTO) who know of their client‘s
false statement in response to the RFIs.163 For those attorneys who
legitimately have no knowledge of the applicant‘s belief about the
best mode or those who strategically position themselves to avoid
such knowledge the threat of disciplinary action is ineffective at

violations could be found in connection with a claim for a Walker Process violation of the
antitrust laws or through inadvertent disclosure in connection with legitimate discovery on
another issue of patentability or claim interpretation. See generally Walker Process Equip.,
Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
159 See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2010); United States v. Smith, 740 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir.
1984).
160 United States v. Dunne, 324 F.3d 1158, 1165 (10th Cir. 2003).
161 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(a)(6) 125 Stat. 284, 291
(2011). Previously, ethical violations before the PTO was subject to the five-year statute of
limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2462. See Scheinbein v. Dudas, 465 F.3d 493, 496 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
162
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(a)(6) 125 Stat. 284, 291
(2011).
163 See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
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forcing the best mode to be disclosed.164
The fourth limitation is the chilling effect that the threat of
enforcement may have on legitimate conduct. This limitation
applies to both methods of enforcement. The heart of enforcement
by criminal prosecution or ethical disciplinary action lies with the
power of these sanctions to chill criminal or unethical conduct and
cause actors to err on the side of disclosing rather than concealing.
And although it may be that some less desirable behavior will be
chilled by these threats of enforcement, these threats may also tend
to chill legitimate conduct. Over-enforcement or even the threat of
criminal prosecution or ethical disciplinary action could result in
fewer applications (and consequently less disclosure). Depending on
the balance struck, these enforcement measures could undermine
the very purpose of the patent system—disclosure to promote the
progress of the useful arts.165
Finally, although not really a limitation on the criminal and
ethical methods of enforcement, is the point that even in the
absence of any enforcement mechanism many applicants may still
disclose the best mode.166 For example, although prior user rights
have been strengthened under the AIA,167 an applicant may still
want to disclose their best mode so it will serve as prior art to
prevent a subsequent applicant from being able to obtain a patent
claiming that mode.168 In addition, applicants may voluntarily
disclose the best mode so they can attempt to narrow their claims in
the event their broader claims are later invalidated.
In sum, although there may be some attractive features of using
criminal or ethical means to enforce best mode disclosures, the
limitations of these means, the costs of implementing them, and the
already existing incentives to disclose render both methods largely
ineffective.
VI. CONCLUSION
The erosion of best mode has been in the works for a number of
164 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct state that knowledge may be inferred from
the circumstances. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (2010) (defining ―knowingly,‖
―known,‖ and ―knows‖). Knowledge inferred from the circumstances could, in theory, be used
to prevent an attorney from avoiding discipline by strategically positioning themselves to
avoid actual knowledge. In reality, however, this is difficult to effectuate.
165 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
166 Chisum, supra note 78, at 318 n.186.
167 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(a)(6), 125 Stat. 284, 292
(2011).
168 See Chisum, supra note 78, at 318 n.186.
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years. The AIA has resulted in best mode remaining as a
requirement for patentability, but has eliminated the commonly
used means of enforcement—litigation to show invalidity or
unenforceability. Up until now, and for good reason, the PTO has
failed to take on the responsibility of policing best mode disclosures.
But by removing the invalidity, unenforceability, and cancellation
arrows from the quiver of best mode enforcement while still keeping
best mode as a requirement for patentability, Congress may have
been attempting to shift the responsibility of enforcement to the
PTO. And although tools exist for the PTO to enforce best mode—
criminal and ethical means of enforcement—these are ineffective
methods and will likely not result in additional best mode
disclosures. In fact, if these measures were adopted, a potential
may exist for less disclosure than what would otherwise result.
In the end, if Congress believes it made the right decision in the
AIA concerning best mode, then Congress should simply bite the
bullet and formally eliminate best mode as a requirement for
patentability. Of course it is difficult to jettison such a long-held
requirement, but in the end, keeping the requirement without
effective enforcement mechanisms does not make much sense.

